PUBLIC-EVIDENCE AI SECURITY CASE STUDY

DeepSeek unauthenticated ClickHouse log exposure

Wiz researchers found an unauthenticated ClickHouse database containing DeepSeek service logs, including sensitive operational information, and notified DeepSeek. The original report documents researcher access and subsequent closure.

Standalone LLM / Generative AITier 2Indicative ERS 3.3 (0.9–5.8)Evidence source date 2025-01-29

Use case sources

Source reports and analysis supporting this case are listed below. AITBM interpretation and any indicative scoring are derived from this public evidence.

Wiz researchers found an unauthenticated ClickHouse database containing DeepSeek service logs, including sensitive operational information, and notified DeepSeek. The original report documents researcher access and subsequent closure.

ASSESSED SYSTEM

Pre-remediation DeepSeek service logging database serving an AI product, as reached by Wiz researchers in January 2025.

OUT OF SCOPE

No claim of malicious third-party exfiltration, training-data leakage, compromise of every DeepSeek deployment, or bypass of model controls.

Architecture: Standalone LLM / Generative AI (decision tree Q3) — Q2 NO: no autonomous agent tool chain is evidenced; Q3: direct model or inference service path is assessed. Tier 2: Tier 2 representative deployment scenario, bounded to the assessed system; the report does not establish every operator tier.

Documented attack or failure path

  1. Researcher identified an exposed ClickHouse endpoint associated with the service.
  2. Unauthenticated queries returned log records and operational data.
  3. DeepSeek closed the exposure after disclosure.

Observed controls and bounded outcomes

Positive credit is given only where the record directly demonstrates a control operating. Recommended or merely presumed controls receive no positive scoring credit.

  • The report documents prompt remediation after notice; that later action is not credited to the exposed configuration.

Layer 1 — Intrinsic Vulnerability Profile

Each sub-metric is placed on its five-level rubric by the evidence quoted beside it. Missing applicable evidence remains unknown. The displayed midpoint and interval are scenario values, not inferred control performance.

Sub-metricScoreRubric basisEvidence
Robustness (Ro) — scenario interval 0.00–1.00 (midpoint 0.50), Tier 2 MVT 0.50 indeterminate
Fairness (Fa) — scenario interval 0.00–1.00 (midpoint 0.50), Tier 2 MVT 0.55 indeterminate
Transparency (Tr) — scenario interval 0.00–1.00 (midpoint 0.50), Tier 2 MVT 0.50 indeterminate
Privacy (Pr) — scenario interval 0.00–1.00 (midpoint 0.50), Tier 2 MVT 0.55 indeterminate
Containment (Cn) — scenario interval 0.00–0.88 (midpoint 0.44), Tier 2 MVT 0.55 indeterminate
Cn-1Scope Enforcement0.00w 0.12The database read boundary lacked effective authorization on this observed path, supporting the 0.00 scope-enforcement anchor.The researcher directly queried the exposed ClickHouse endpoint without authentication and retrieved sensitive service logs.source: primary report

Unknown, not N/A: 25 applicable sub-metrics lack admissible public evidence. The lower, midpoint, and upper scenarios evaluate each at 0.00, 0.50, and 1.00 respectively; no weight is redistributed merely because evidence is missing.

Layer 2 — Operational Risk Posture

DimensionScoreJustification
AaAutonomy Amplification0.25w 0.25The bounded database retrieval path is request driven and no agent action is shown.
AsAttack Surface Exposure0.75w 0.35Representative public AI service log infrastructure was reachable from the Internet; exact deployment inventory is unknown.
CpCascade Potential1.00w 0.20No verified System Dependency Graph or DGC is available, so the framework worst-case Cp default applies.GDCP: worst-case default — no verified dependency graph published elevated
RfRemediation Feasibility0.25w 0.20Closing the documented open database is an inferred configuration repair, not measured enterprise remediation performance.

Nelevated = 1 (dimensions strictly above 0.75) → CRM = 1.00.

Layer 3 — Public-evidence confidence diagnostic

ComponentScoreBasis
Pc — Public provenance evidence0.25Minimal public provenance: the original report identifies the affected path and event, but no operator assessment pack, signed configuration inventory, or repeated metric battery is published.
Ec — Public evaluation coverage0.03coverage 0.04 (1 of 26 applicable sub-metrics) × independence 0.80 × fidelity 1.00. No Full, Standard, or Lite pathway is claimed for a retrospective article.
Tf — Public-evidence freshness0.01Evidence dated 2025-01-29; age 627 days on the workpaper reference date. Components: T_calendar 0.01 · C_event 0.35 · C_monitor 0.60. Binding term: T_calendar. Evidence reference is 2026-10-18, 627 days after the earliest substantive public evidence (2025-01-29). C_monitor = 0.60 applies the Table 44 conservative default for Tier 2 because usable public monitoring-coverage evidence is unavailable; it does not assert that the deployment had no telemetry. C_event = 0.35: Wiz directly queried the unauthenticated DeepSeek log database and confirmed access to sensitive service records, a material authorization-boundary failure. No targeted post-event re-attestation is published for the bounded pre-fix assessment. No generic C_evidence cap is assigned from missing public inputs alone. These caps describe public-evidence confidence and do not change the normalized-assurance indicative ERS or assert an unreported operational control failure.

Public-evidence ACI = (Pc × Ec × Tf)1/3 = 0.04 — diagnostic status: Invalid as assessment-of-record evidence. It describes the evidence available to this case study, not the assurance of the underlying system, and is not inserted into the normalized-assurance scenario ERS.

Indicative ERS — normalized-assurance scenario

Worp · ORP0.25(0.25) + 0.35(0.75) + 0.20(1.00) + 0.20(0.25) = 0.575
CRMNelevated = 1 → 1.00
ORPeffective0.575 × 1.00 = 0.575
Wivp · IVP midpoint0.25(0.50) + 0.30(0.50) + 0.15(0.50) + 0.20(0.50) + 0.10(0.44) = 0.494
IVP mitigation0.15 + 0.85(1 − 0.494) = 0.580
Scenario assuranceACI fixed at 1.000 for cross-case comparison; public-evidence ACI 0.040 is diagnostic only
Indicative ERS midpointmin(10, 0.575 × 0.580 × 1/1.000 × 10) = 3.3
Unknown-input interval0.9–5.8; 25 unknown applicable sub-metrics set to 1.00 / 0.00 at the bounds

Published CVSS beside indicative ERS

Each published CVSS record is shown exactly as its scorer published it, one per vulnerability record, with the version, metric group and vector when stated, plus its source and access date. Records are never combined or inferred from a CVE's existence.

INDICATIVE ERS · NORMALIZED-ASSURANCE SCENARIO

3.3 midpoint, interval 0.9–5.8; Low-Moderate scenario band; ACI fixed at 1.00. The published CVSS records do not enter this calculation.

PUBLISHED CVSS

CVSS — no applicable published score verified.

CVSS describes an individual vulnerability as its scorer published it. Indicative ERS describes the assessed AI deployment under the normalized-assurance scenario, so the two values are not direct equivalents and neither replaces the other.

WHAT THIS CASE TEACHES

Unauthenticated database reads support one failed scope anchor; they do not establish model-level leakage tests.

Sources: Original primary report — DeepSeek unauthenticated ClickHouse log exposure (2025-01-29)

AITBM sub-metrics referenced