PUBLIC-EVIDENCE AI SECURITY CASE STUDY

MetaGPT DataInterpreter executes unchecked generated code

The LLMSmith researchers list MetaGPT 0.7.3 DataInterpreter in Table 5 as a prompt-triggered RCE path that executes LLM-generated code without checking it. Their validation used a controlled research configuration; they did not establish a named production victim for this…

Agentic / MCP SystemTier 2Indicative ERS 4.3 (1.2–7.5)Evidence source date 2025-02-27

Use case sources

Source reports and analysis supporting this case are listed below. AITBM interpretation and any indicative scoring are derived from this public evidence.

Linked library records

Independent products or attack paths are assessed separately. A combined report receives no aggregate score.

Original report record: LLMSmith: RCE Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Applications.

The LLMSmith researchers list MetaGPT 0.7.3 DataInterpreter in Table 5 as a prompt-triggered RCE path that executes LLM-generated code without checking it. Their validation used a controlled research configuration; they did not establish a named production victim for this specific API. The paper lists no CVE for this independent API.

ASSESSED SYSTEM

Representative LLM-integrated application using MetaGPT 0.7.3 DataInterpreter in the tested version, with model-generated code reaching the described framework execution API.

OUT OF SCOPE

The assessed path is MetaGPT 0.7.3 DataInterpreter in the version tested by the paper. Other framework APIs, later fixes, the researchers' anonymous apps, and in-the-wild attacker exploitation are outside scope.

Architecture: Agentic / MCP System (decision tree Q2) — Q2 applies to the MetaGPT agent workflow where model-generated task steps reach the documented code-execution API; no additional peer-agent exploit path is assumed. Tier 2: Tier 2 representative public-facing service scenario; the original source does not establish every operator tier.

Documented attack or failure path

  1. A user prompt reached an LLM-integrated application using the specified framework API.
  2. The LLM generated code that the framework API passed to execution without an effective host-scope check.
  3. The researchers validated code execution in a controlled copy or test configuration; no named victim incident is inferred.

Observed controls and bounded outcomes

Positive credit is given only where the record directly demonstrates a control operating. Recommended or merely presumed controls receive no positive scoring credit.

  • No positive containment control for this pre-fix tested path is established by the paper. Other LLMSmith test applications may have blocked attacks, but are separate boundaries.

Layer 1 — Intrinsic Vulnerability Profile

Each sub-metric is placed on its five-level rubric by the evidence quoted beside it. Missing applicable evidence remains unknown. The displayed midpoint and interval are scenario values, not inferred control performance.

Sub-metricScoreRubric basisEvidence
Robustness (Ro) — scenario interval 0.00–1.00 (midpoint 0.50), Tier 2 MVT 0.50 indeterminate
Fairness (Fa) — scenario interval 0.00–1.00 (midpoint 0.50), Tier 2 MVT 0.55 indeterminate
Transparency (Tr) — scenario interval 0.00–1.00 (midpoint 0.50), Tier 2 MVT 0.50 indeterminate
Privacy (Pr) — scenario interval 0.00–1.00 (midpoint 0.50), Tier 2 MVT 0.55 indeterminate
Containment (Cn) — scenario interval 0.00–0.91 (midpoint 0.46), Tier 2 MVT 0.55 indeterminate
Cn-1Scope Enforcement0.00w 0.09The model-directed code path could execute beyond the user task boundary with no effective host restriction, matching the Cn-1 0.00 anchor.LLMSmith Table 5 identifies MetaGPT 0.7.3 DataInterpreter as prompt-triggered code execution without checking the generated code.source: primary report

Unknown, not N/A: 25 applicable sub-metrics lack admissible public evidence. The lower, midpoint, and upper scenarios evaluate each at 0.00, 0.50, and 1.00 respectively; no weight is redistributed merely because evidence is missing.

Layer 2 — Operational Risk Posture

DimensionScoreJustification
AaAutonomy Amplification0.75w 0.25Representative activity level for the documented bounded AI path; deployment-specific autonomy was not measured.
AsAttack Surface Exposure0.75w 0.35Representative exposure of the documented entry path; this is a scenario assumption and not a census of all operators.
CpCascade Potential1.00w 0.20No verified System Dependency Graph or DGC is published, so framework worst-case Cp default applies.GDCP: worst-case default — no verified dependency graph published elevated
RfRemediation Feasibility0.50w 0.20The paper does not establish deployed repair time or a patch for this exact tested API. The remediation score is an explicit representative comparison assumption; actual repair feasibility is unknown, not measured recovery time.

Nelevated = 1 (dimensions strictly above 0.75) → CRM = 1.00.

Layer 3 — Public-evidence confidence diagnostic

ComponentScoreBasis
Pc — Public provenance evidence0.25Minimal public provenance identifies the affected path but supplies no operator assessment pack, signed configuration inventory, or repeated metric battery.
Ec — Public evaluation coverage0.03coverage 0.04 (1 of 26 applicable sub-metrics) × independence 0.80 × fidelity 0.95. No Full, Standard, or Lite pathway is claimed for a retrospective article.
Tf — Public-evidence freshness0.00Evidence dated 2025-02-27; age 598 days on the workpaper reference date. Components: T_containment 0.00 · T_calendar 0.01 · C_monitor 0.60. Binding term: T_containment. Evidence reference is 2026-10-18, 598 days after earliest substantive public evidence (2025-02-27). C_monitor uses the conservative Tier 2 public-evidence default because usable monitoring-coverage evidence is unavailable; it does not assert no deployment telemetry. No C_event cap is asserted from research or an advisory without a dated victim incident. No generic C_evidence cap is assigned from missing public inputs. Indicative ERS uses normalized ACI = 1.00 for comparison only.

Public-evidence ACI = (Pc × Ec × Tf)1/3 = 0.01 — diagnostic status: Invalid as assessment-of-record evidence. It describes the evidence available to this case study, not the assurance of the underlying system, and is not inserted into the normalized-assurance scenario ERS.

Indicative ERS — normalized-assurance scenario

Worp · ORP0.25(0.75) + 0.35(0.75) + 0.20(1.00) + 0.20(0.50) = 0.750
CRMNelevated = 1 → 1.00
ORPeffective0.750 × 1.00 = 0.750
Wivp · IVP midpoint0.25(0.50) + 0.30(0.50) + 0.15(0.50) + 0.20(0.50) + 0.10(0.46) = 0.495
IVP mitigation0.15 + 0.85(1 − 0.495) = 0.579
Scenario assuranceACI fixed at 1.000 for cross-case comparison; public-evidence ACI 0.009 is diagnostic only
Indicative ERS midpointmin(10, 0.750 × 0.579 × 1/1.000 × 10) = 4.3
Unknown-input interval1.2–7.5; 25 unknown applicable sub-metrics set to 1.00 / 0.00 at the bounds

Published CVSS beside indicative ERS

Each published CVSS record is shown exactly as its scorer published it, one per vulnerability record, with the version, metric group and vector when stated, plus its source and access date. Records are never combined or inferred from a CVE's existence.

INDICATIVE ERS · NORMALIZED-ASSURANCE SCENARIO

4.3 midpoint, interval 1.2–7.5; Low-Moderate scenario band; ACI fixed at 1.00. The published CVSS records do not enter this calculation.

PUBLISHED CVSS

CVSS — no applicable published score verified.

No CVE or complete versioned CVSS score was published for this paper row.

CVSS describes an individual vulnerability as its scorer published it. Indicative ERS describes the assessed AI deployment under the normalized-assurance scenario, so the two values are not direct equivalents and neither replaces the other.

WHAT THIS CASE TEACHES

MetaGPT 0.7.3 DataInterpreter is one bounded prompt-to-code research path. The paper lists no CVE for this independent API.

Sources: Original LLMSmith study, Table 2 and Table 5 (revision 2025-02-27)

AITBM sub-metrics referenced